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Abstract
We model a dynamic duopoly in which rms can potentially drive their rivals from the
market. A consequence is that, for some ranges of parameters, the static Cournot equilibrium
outcome cannot be sustained in an innitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov
perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one rm will eventually be driven from the
market with probability one. The presence of potential bankruptcy makes the set of outcomes
supportable via tacit collusion di¤erent than in the absence of bankruptcy. We show that pro-
ducer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration,
since the outcome maximizing joint prots is skewed in favor of more e¢ cient rm. Our nu-
merical simulations illuminate that consumer surplus and social welfare also increase in many
cases, although those welfare e¤ects are ambiguous in general.
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1. Introduction
There is ample evidence that nancial constraints play an important role in the behavior of rms
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). We begin with the observation that the
punishment for the violation of a nancial constraint must be severe, otherwise rms would default
all the time. Suppose that the punishment is so severe that rms violating nancial constraints
lose the capacity to compete and disappear (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).1 Firms might then
have incentives to take actions that would make it impossible for competitors to fulll nancial
constraints in the hope of getting rid of them.
In this paper, we model a quantity-setting duopoly in which rms take into account their and
their rivalsnancial limits, specically that rms go bankrupt (exit) if they earn negative prots
in a period. We introduce the concept of bankruptcy-free (BF hereafter) outputs. These are output
pairs in which each rms prot is non-negative (so no rm goes bankrupt) and in which no rm
could, by changing its output, bankrupt another without bankrupting itself. A critical insight of
our analysis is that static Cournot equilibrium outputs can fail to be BF when rmscost functions
are asymmetric. In particular, if rms have constant, but di¤erent, average costs, the Cournot
outcome can never be BF: a lower-cost rm can bankrupt a higher-cost rival without bankrupting
itself by increasing its output to the point that the price falls between their average costs. In a
dynamic game, such a move is protable unless rms discount future too much, because it can get
rid of a competitor.
In our dynamic game, in which a quantity-setting game is played for innitely many periods
unless no rm goes bankrupt, the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in pure strategies, if it
exists, is the Cournot equilibrium. But if the Cournot outcome is not BF and rms have incentives
to predate for some discounts factors, MPE must entail mixed strategies. Inter alia, this suggests
that the commonly used constant-marginal-cost Cournot model could be misleading if rms have
di¤erent marginal costs and are nancially constrained.
We show that the mixed strategy MPE exists. Assuming constant average costs and concave
prot functions we characterize the equilibrium. The support of each rms mixed strategy contains
exactly one interval. The support of the inferior rm has a mass point in the upper extreme of the
1Even though rms can be reorganized after bankruptcy and continue business, the survival rate of rms after
bankruptcy is typically low, 18% US, 20% in UK and 6% in France, see Couwenberg (2001).
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interval which coincides with the best reply in the static game to the superior rms mixed strategy.
For the superior rm, the support also contains an isolated mass point which coincides with the
best reply in the static game to the inferior rms mixed strategy. The mass point lies strictly below
the interval support. Since the superior rm would not produce a larger output than the best reply
unless bankruptcy occurs, outputs in the interval support reect the predatory activities of the
superior rm. The inferior rm becomes bankrupt with positive probability in each period. The
introduction of nancial constraints implies that monopolization (by the e¢ cient rm) will occur
with positive probability in each period and thus, it will almost surely occur in the long run. The
probability of predation increases with the discount factor. Moreover, any of the outputs chosen
by the superior rm are larger than the Cournot output and the outputs of the inferior rm are
smaller than its Cournot output.
We consider the consequences of potential bankruptcy on the set of outcomes supportable
via tacit collusion. We show that producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater
under bankruptcy consideration than in the absence of bankruptcy. Thus, in this case, bankruptcy
considerations help collusion. However, this greater possibility of collusion does not imply a greater
social welfare loss. This is because the outcome that maximizes joint prots is skewed in favor of
superior rm and this rm produces more e¢ ciently than the inferior rm. When rms have large
discount factors, predation pays o¤ for the superior rm and the inferior rm produces very little
fearing bankruptcy. Consequently, total output becomes larger under bankruptcy consideration,
and thus total welfare also increases.
We end this introduction with a preliminary discussion of the literature (see more on this in the
nal section). Although a number of papers demonstrate that the nancial structure does a¤ect
market outcomes in an oligopoly, most previous studies adopt either static or two-stage models.
There are at least two exceptions, Spagnolo (2000) and Kawakami and Yoshida (1997). Both papers
make use of games with innite time like ours. The former examines the role of stock options in
repeated Cournot games. In his model, unlike standard repeated games, rms do not necessarily
maximize average discounted prots because stock options a¤ect managersincentives. Taking this
e¤ect into consideration, Spagnolo (2000) shows that collusion becomes easier to achieve. The latter
incorporates a simple exit constraint into the repeated prisonersdilemma. In their model, each
rm must exit from the market no matter how it plays if the rival deviates over certain number of
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periods, and hence no output prole can be bankruptcy free. They show that predations inevitably
occur when bankruptcy constraints are asymmetric and rms are long-sighted.
Finally, our approach might provide support to the notion that rms may engage in predatory
activities when pursuing prot maximization. Standard explanations of this behavior are based
on incomplete information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), the learning curve (Cabral and Riordan,
1994) or rms playing an attrition game (Roth, 1996). In our model, rms have complete informa-
tion. Technology is xed and rms play standard quantity-setting games. Nevertheless, we obtain
predation as a competitive equilibrium in mixed strategies. More importantly, both predation and
tacit collusion can be derived (as di¤erent equilibria) in a single model, which is a completely new
result to the best of our knowledge.
2. The model
Two rms compete in an innite number of periods. In each period rms simultaneously choose
quantities. Firms produce a homogeneous product. In order to focus on the strategic decisions
regarding outputs, we assume that rms cannot accumulate prots. Firms become bankrupt if
they su¤er losses in a period. A bankrupt rm exits the market (i.e., produceszero every period
thereafter). When making its quantity decision in a period, each rm knows what any rm has
produced in all previous periods and which rms became bankrupt. The formal denitions are
given in Section 4. In the rest of this section we present the elements of the game that is played in
each period. For simplicity, the time dimension is not considered yet.
We refer to one of the rms as the superior (S) and the other as the inferior (I). Let j 2 fS; Ig
denote a rm and xj 2 R+ the output of rm j: Let Ci(xi) denote the cost function, where
Ci : R+ ! R+ is an everywhere twice di¤erentiable function and Ci(0) = 0: Assume that for
all output, x, ACS(x)  ACI(x), where ACj() is rm js average-cost schedule. Assume that
average cost is nondecreasing and twice di¤erentiable. Let x = (xS ; xI) denote an output prole,
and let X = xS + xI be the aggregate output. Let p(X) be the inverse demand function assumed
to be strictly decreasing in X for any positive price and twice di¤erentiable. Derivatives are
denoted by primes; e.g., p0(X) is the slope of the inverse demand at X, etc. Prots for rm i are
i  p(X)xi Ci(xi); and written as i(x) or as i(xi; xj). We assume the classical conditions that
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guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium namely, for all x = (xS ; xI);
p00(X)xi + p0(X) < 0; for all i 2 fS; Ig; (2.1)
p0(X)  C 00i (xi) < 0; for all i 2 fS; Ig: (2.2)
These conditions are satised if, for example, demand is linear and cost functions are quadratic.
We denote by xC = (xCS ; x
C
I ) the Cournot output prole and by 
C
i rm is prot at the Cournot
output prole.
Central to the analysis of our dynamic set up is the concept of bankruptcy-free (BF) output
proles.
As dened in the Introduction, bankruptcy-free (BF) output proles are those in which no
rm makes negative prot and there is no deviation such that either rm can drive the other into
bankruptcy without bankrupting itself. Formally,
Denition 1. An output prole x^ = (x^S ; x^I) is bankruptcy-free (BF) if
a) i(x^)  0 for both i 2 fS; Ig; and
b) i(x^i; x)  0 for any x such that j(x; x^i)  0 (i 6= j).
Note that if rm i is required to make some prot vi (it could be either positive or negative) to
avoid bankruptcy, we can dene a new prot function as ~i(x)  i(x)  vi and redene BF with
respect to this new prot function.
3. Properties of the BF set
In this section we characterize the BF output proles. The characterizations will become important
for the analysis of the dynamic game.
Lemma 1. An output prole x = (xS ; xI) is BF if and only if j(x)  0 for both j and
ACj(xj)  ACk(D(ACj(xj))  xj) if xj > 0; (3.1)
where D() is aggregate demand and k 6= j.
Proof. The denition of BF entails j(x)  0 for both j. If a rm does not produce, it cannot
be driven to bankruptcy; hence, assume rm js output is positive and consider whether rm k can
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bankrupt it. Dene
x(xj) = inffx 2 R+ j j(xj ; x) < 0g: (3.2)
By continuity, j(xj ; x(xj)) = 0. It follows that
p(xj + x(xj)) = ACj(xj); hence, x(xj) = D(ACj(xj))  xj : (3.3)
Demand slopes down, so does the price, and thus, a rivals prot decreases with output. Those facts
and the assumption that the average cost is non-decreasing mean rm k can bankrupt j without
bankrupting itself if and only if
0  p(xj+ x^k) ACk(x^k) < p(xj+x(xj)) ACk(x(xj)) = ACj(xj) ACk(D(ACj(xj)) xj) (3.4)
for some x^k > x(xj). But (3.4) can hold if and only if (3.1) does not.
Corollary 1. If the average cost is constant for both rms, ACj(x) = cj ; j 2 fS; Ig; and cS < cI
no output prole with both rms active is BF. In a BF output prole only the superior rm is
producing.
Note that the joint prot maximum is BF because only the superior rm is producing a positive
output. The Cournot output is BF if (i) cS = cI or (ii) rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent so that only
the superior rm produces in the Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let x be BF and let x0 be a smaller prole (i.e., x0ixi for all i 2 fS; Ig). Then,
x0 is also BF.
Proof. We have
0  ACk(D(ACj(xj))  xj) ACj(xj)  ACk(D(ACj(x0j))  x0j) ACj(x0j); (3.5)
where the rst inequality follows from Lemma 1 given the assumption x is BF and the second
because demand curves slope down and average cost is nondecreasing. Invoking Lemma 1, this
chain implies x0 is BF.
A useful characterization of the BF set can be provided under the following additional assump-
tion.
Assumption 1. Both rms have an increasing average cost and there exists x0S such that
ACI(0) = ACS(x
0
S ) < p(x
0
S ).
6
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806055 
Observe Assumption 1 holds provided the average cost curve of the superior rm rises above
the minimum of the inferior rms average cost curve and such that the break even output of the
superior rm yields a price above the minimum of the inferior rms average cost. Assumption 1
always holds if, for example, demand is linear and Ci(xi) = ix
2
i with i > 0:
In the next Lemma we show a consequence of Assumption 1 that is useful to characterize the
BF set under Assumption 1.
Lemma 2. Assumption 1 implies that there exists a unique x = (xS ; xI) 6= (0; 0) such that i(x) = 0
for all i 2 fS; Ig:
Proof. Since average costs are increasing, the functions ACI() and ACS() are invertible, so
for any level  2 [ACS(x0S );1) there exist xI() and xS(), continuous in , such that
 = ACI(xI()) = ACS(xS()): (3.6)
By Assumption 1, if  = ACS(x0S ); then
p(xI() + xS()) > ACI(xI()) = ACS(xS()): (3.7)
But as !1 the left term goes to 0, while the middle and right terms stay above 0; by continuity
and given that demand decreases and average costs are increasing, there must exist a unique 
such that
p(xI(
) + xS()) = ACI(xI()) = ACS(xS()): (3.8)
Let x =(xI() + xS()). By construction, i(x) = 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig:
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds: Let x = (xS ; xI) be as described in Lemma 2. Then the
set of BF output proles is:
BF = f(xS ; xI) j 0  xi  xi for i 2 fS; Igg: (3.9)
Proof. Trivially, x is BF. By Proposition 1, it follows that all x < x are BF . To complete the
proof, we need to show that no x can be BF when xj > xj for one or more j: Because demand
slopes down and average costs are increasing, if x > x; then i(x) < i(x) = 0 for all i 2 fS; Ig; so
x is not BF. Suppose then, xj > xj ; but xi < xi. Observe xj < xj + xi; if not, the chain
p(xi + xj) ACj(xj)  p(xi + xj) ACj(xj) < p(xi + xj) ACj(xj) = 0 (3.10)
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shows x is not BF. Given xj < xj + xi; there exists x^i > 0 such that x^i + xj = xj + xi: Let
p = p(x^i + xj) = p(xj + xi): (3.11)
The average cost is increasing; hence,
p  ACi(x^i) > p  ACi(xi) = 0 = p  ACj(xj) > p  ACj(xj): (3.12)
Expression (3.12) entails that rm i can bankrupt rm j without bankrupting itself; hence, x is
not BF.
To close this section, we work out in an example the conditions under which joint prot maxi-
mum and Cournots output proles are BF under Assumption 1.
Example 1. Let demand be linear, p(xS+xI) = a xS xI ; and cost be quadratic, CS(x) = Sx2;
CI(x) = Ix
2 with 0 < S  I : By Lemma 3 the BF set is completely characterized by the output
prole x = (xS ; xI) such that ACI(xI) = ACS(xS) = p(xS + xI); thus, S xS = I xI = a  xS   xI :
xS =
Ia
(1 + S)(1 + I)  1
; xI =
Sa
(1 + S)(1 + I)  1
: (3.13)
The Cournot equilibrium is given by
xCS =
(1 + 2I)a
4(1 + I)(1 + S)  1
: (3.14)
xCI =
(1 + 2S)a
4(1 + I)(1 + S)  1
(3.15)
For the superior rm, it is always the case that xCS  xS : For the inferior rm, xCI  xI if and only
if
S 
I
2(1 + I)
: (3.16)
Thus, the Cournot equilibrium is BF if and only if condition (3.16) holds. The right hand side of
(3.16) is increasing in I , which is the parameter dening the marginal cost of the inferior rm.
Thus the larger I is, i.e. the more ine¢ cient the inferior rm is, the easier it is for the superior rm
to bankrupt the inferior rm. Conversely, the larger S is, the more di¢ cult it is for the superior
rm to bankrupt the inferior rm.
Finally, in this example, the joint-prot-maximizing output, xJ = (xJS ; x
J
I ); is always BF because
the marginal cost of both rms is the same, Sx
J
S = Ix
J
I (production e¢ ciency) and prots are
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non-negative for both rms. Furthermore, since S xS = I xI , trivially x
J
j  xj for all j 2 fS; Ig:
Following the same reasoning, the perfectly competitive equilibrium, which is also the e¢ cient
allocation, is also BF.
4. Dynamic Competition with Bankruptcy
In this section we focus on the dynamic model.
In each period t each rm i 2 fS; Ig chooses an output denoted by xti: Let xt = (xtI ; xtS) be a
prole of outputs in period t. The prots obtained by rm i in period t are i(xt) t = 0; 1; ::::;  ; ::We
dene a state at t as the set of rms that did not fall into bankruptcy in previous periods called
active rms. Let  2 (0; 1) be the common discount factor. Discounted prots for rm i are i =P1
t=0 
ti(x
t). The continuation prot in period t is given by ti =
P1
r=0 
ri(x
t+r). At period 0
the game begins with the null history h0: For t  1; a history, denoted by ht = (x0;x1; ::;xt 1), is a
list of all outputs in all periods before t: A strategy for rm i; i; (pure or mixed) is a sequence of
maps, one for each period t; mapping all possible period t histories into a probability distribution
in outputs. Let  = (I ; S) denote a strategy prole (pure or mixed). A Markovian strategy
for rm i is a mapping from the set of active rms into a probability distribution on outputs. A
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is a collection of strategies which are a NE in every
possible subgame. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a SPNE in which rms use Markovian
strategies only. To ease notation whenever no confusion can arise, we drop the time superindex.
In innitely repeated games without bankruptcy considerations there is only one state, and
hence the Markovian strategy coincides exactly with the Cournot output. Under bankruptcy con-
siderations, when the Cournot output prole is BF, the unique MPE is that both rms produce the
Cournot outcome when both are active and, when only one rm is active, this rm produces the
monopoly outcome. In equilibrium both rms are active in every period. A di¤erent analysis has
to be made when the Cournot outcome prole is not BF because it could be the case that for some
discounts factors one rm may have incentives to bankrupt the other rm. In the following Lemma
we provide the range of the discount factor that is needed in order to prevent such a deviation.
Lemma 4. Suppose that (xCS ; x
C
I ) is not BF. Then, there exists  < 1 such that the Markovian
strategy xi = xCi ; i 2 fS; Ig in the states with all rms active, and xi = xMi in states where only
rm i is active constitutes a MPE if and only if   .
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Proof. Deviations in states in which only one rm is active are not protable because the
active rm is producing the monopoly outcome and the other rm is out of the market. Thus,
only deviations at states with both rms active are possible. Note that if both rms are active
and produce Cournot outputs, prots for rm i are Ci =(1   ). Given that the Cournot output
prole is not BF, a potential protable deviation is such that one rm drives the other to bankruptcy
without bankrupting itself. The discounted prots for this move are Di +
M
i =(1 ); where Mi are
monopoly prots and Di are prots in the deviation for rm i: Firm i drives rm j to bankruptcy
by producing an outcome x^i > x(xCj ); where x(x
C
j ) is such that j(x
C
j ; x(x
C
j )) = 0: Given that
j(x
C
j ; x
C
i )  0; x(xCj )  xCi ; and therefore, for all x^i > x(xCj ); i(x^i; xCj ) < i(x(xCj ); xCj ): Thus,
driving rm j to bankruptcy is not a protable deviation for rm i if and only if
Ci  (1  )i(x(xCj ); xCj ) + Mi : (4.1)
For  ' 0 the right hand side of 4.1 is approximately i(x(xCj ); xCj ), and then the inequality holds
because Ci  i(x(xCj ); xCj ): For  ' 1 the right hand side of 4.1 is approximately Mi ; and the
inequality does not hold because Ci < 
M
i : Since the right hand side of 4.1 is decreasing in ; by
the intermediate value theorem there is i such that 
C
i  (1  )i(x(xCj ); xCj ) + Mi if and only
if   i: In conclusion, by taking  = minfigi2fS;Ig; we get the result.
When  > ; a MPE may involve mixed strategies. We start by a general observation that will
be useful later on.
Lemma 5. For any pure strategy MPE, no rm goes bankrupt.
Proof. Suppose that rm i goes bankrupt in some period t, which happens only if its prot in
t is negative. Since the prots after bankruptcy are always zero, is continuation prot at t is zero.
However, producing nothing at t and in any of the following periods, assures zero prots, so rm i
can protably deviate by choosing xti = 0 at t. Thus we derive contradiction.
Note that Lemma 5 holds even when strategies are not constrained to be Markovian. The
following lemma shows that when the repeated Cournot outcome cannot be a MPE equilibrium,
no MPE equilibrium in pure strategies exists when  is large.
Lemma 6. For any  > , there is no MPE in pure strategies.
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Proof. Given no bankruptcy occurs in an equilibrium in pure strategies (Lemma 5), the re-
peated Cournot outcome when both rms are active is a unique mutual best reply in pure strategies
that are Markovian. However, it cannot be an equilibrium for  >  by Lemma 4.
In light of Lemma 6, we study equilibria in mixed strategies when  > . The existence of a
MPE is guaranteed by an extension of a theorem proved in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) which we
include in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. For any , there exists at least one MPE, possibly, in mixed strategies.
The characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium is not an easy task. To characterize the
equilibrium support, we impose two assumptions.
Assumption AC The average cost for each rm is constant.
Assumption EC Each rm is expected per-period prot function (given other rms mixed
strategy) is strictly concave in xi for any xi  0.
Let E[i(xi; xj) j j ] be the expected per-period prot of rm i given that rm j is using the
mixed strategy j :
Proposition 3. Under assumptions AC and EC, and  > ; a mixed strategy MPE must satisfy
the following conditions:
(i) Firm S randomizes over x0S [ (xS ; xS] where x0S < xS :
(ii) Firm I randomizes over (xI ; xI
) [ xI:
(iii) xI = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ].
(iv) x0S = argmaxxS E[S(xI ; qS) j I ].
(v) I(xI ; xS
) = 0.
(vi) I(xI; xS) = 0.
(vii) I(xI; x0S) > 0:
The proof of Proposition 3 is long and involved and it is shown in the Appendix. We highlight
here some of the properties. 1) The support of each rms mixed strategy contains exactly one
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interval and one mass point. The mass point for the superior rm is an isolated point and the mass
point for the inferior rm is the superior extreme of the interval. Moreover, for each rm the mass
point coincides with the best reply in the static game to the other rms mixed strategy. 2) Given
condition (vi), by producing x0S the superior rm cannot bankrupt rm I. Thus, this rm will not
produce a larger output than x0S unless bankruptcy occurs. Therefore, outputs in (x

S ; xS
] reect
the predatory activities of the superior rm. 3) For the inferior rm, the length of its support
reects the delicate balance between a larger output and a larger probability of bankruptcy, which
occurs with positive probability in each period. The inferior rm will eventually be driven from
the market with probability one.
In the following proposition we give the characterization of the probability distribution on the
support for each rm under the assumption that demand is linear.
Proposition 4. Suppose that AC and EC holds and demand is linear, p(X) = a X: Let cI and
cS be the marginal cost of I and S respectively, let aI = a  cI and aS = a  cS : For any  > , a
mixed strategy MPE is such that:
(i) Firm S randomizes according to a mixture cdf pS + (1  pS)FS(xS) with support x0S [ (xS ; xS]
where FS(xS) is a cdf on (xS ; xS
] and pS is the probability of producing x0S with
F 0S(xS) =
2(xS   xS)
(xS   xS)2
; and (4.2)
pS = 1 
(1  )(xS   xS)2
(xS   2xS + aI)(aI   xS)
(4.3)
(ii) Firm I randomizes according to a mixture cdf pI + (1  pI)GI(xI) with support [xI ; xI)[ xI
where GI(xI) is a cdf on [xI ; xI
) and pI is the probability of producing xI with
G0I(xI) =
2(x0S   (aI   xI))
(xI   xI)

xI + xI   2aI + 2x0S
 ; and (4.4)
pI = 1 
(xI
   xI)

xI
 + xI   2aI + 2x0S


h
(2x0S   aI + xI)(aI   xI)  MS
i : (4.5)
where MS = (
aS
2 )
2
12
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806055 
(iii) Finally, x0S ; x

S ; xS
; xI ; xI
 are the solutions of the following system:
2xS   aI = pSx0S + (1  pS)
Z xS
xS
xSF
0
S(xS)dxS (4.6)
aS   2x0S = pIxI + (1  pI)
Z xI
xI
xIG
0
I(xI)dxI (4.7)
1
1   (x
0
S)
2 = (2x0S   xS)xS + 
MS
1   (4.8)
xI
 = aI   xS (4.9)
xI = aI   xS (4.10)
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix. We comment here the content of each of the
equations that dene the support of the mixed strategy for each rm. Equations (4.9) and (4.10)
follow form (v) and (vi) is Proposition 3. The right hand side of equation (4.6) is the expected value
of the outputs in the support of rm Ss mixed strategy. This expected value has to be equal to 2xS 
aI for two reasons: rst, by (iii) in Proposition 3, xI = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]; since demand
is linear, xI is the solution of aI 2xI ExS = 0: Secondly, by (vi) in Proposition 3, xI = aI xS :
Thus, ExS = 2xS aI : The right hand side of equation (4.7) is the expected value of the outputs in
the support of rm Is mixed strategy. By (iv) in Proposition 3, x0S = argmaxxS E[S(xI ; qS) j I ];
since demand is linear, x0S is the solution of aS   2x0S   ExI = 0: Thus, ExI = aS   2x0S : The left
hand side of equation (4.8) is the expected payo¤ of rm S at (x0S ; I): By (vii) in Proposition 3 ,
I(xI
; x0S) > 0; thus, when rm S produces x
0
S ; the probability of bankruptcy for rm I is zero,
and consequently the payo¤ of rm S is (aS   x0S   ExI)x0S=(1   ) = (x0S)2=(1   ): The right
hand side of equation (4.8) is the expected payo¤ of rm S at (xS; I): Since by (v) in Proposition
3, I(xI ; xS
) = 0; the probability of bankruptcy for rm I is 1: Thus, the payo¤ at (xS; I) is
S(xS
; I)+ MS =(1  ): Finally, since both x0S and xS are in the support of Ss mixed strategy,
the payo¤s are equal.
Finally, we highlight that when  ! ; pI = 1; pS = 1; x0S = xCS ; xI = xCI ; xI = xI; xS =
xS
 = aI   xCI ; is a solution of the system.
The equations that characterize equilibrium do not allow for an explicit solution, but we have
made some simulations for aS = 125 and aI 2 f100; 105; 110; 115; 120,124g and  '  up to :99.
We present the results for aS = 125; aI = 100: The ndings that we show here are robust to the
consideration of di¤erent aI : These simulations are available under request.
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Example 2. In this example aI = 100; and aS = 125: In this case,  = 0:3077, and the Cournot
outputs are xCI = 25 and x
C
S = 50: The table below shows how the support of the mixed strategy
changes with ; for  > .
 xI xI
 x0S x

S xS

0:31 24.86 24.99 50.001 75.001 75.14
0:34 23.1 24.8 50.15 75.2 76.9
0:4 19.48 23.83 50.89 76.17 80.52
0:5 13.66 21.36 52.63 78.64 86.34
0:6 8.24 17.98 54.68 82.02 91.76
0:7 3.71 13.22 56.95 86.78 96.29
0:8 1.06 7.43 59.27 92.57 98.94
0:9 0.17 2.87 61.16 97.13 99.83
0:99 0.0012 0.23 62.39 99.77 99.9988
We see that the length of both supports decreases when  is su¢ ciently large ( > 0:7), so the
behavior of both rms becomes much more predictable when rms do not discount future very
much. As expected, the support for rm S increases with  and the support for rm I decreases
with : This reects that predation is more protable when rms discount future less. Finally,
when  ! 1; rm S sets x0S equal to the monopoly output 62:50:
In the following table we show how pI , the probability of producing xI, and pS , the probability of
producing x0S changes with :
 pI pS
0:31 0.99 0.999
0:34 0.88 0.99
0:4 0.73 0.95
0:5 0.60 0.85
0:6 0.54 0.72
0:7 0.57 0.54
0:8 0.70 0.31
0:9 0.87 0.12
0:999 0.99 0.01
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We see that the probability to produce x0S decreases with  showing how the predation outputs in
(xS ; xS
] become dominant when rms discount future very little . In contrast, the probability of
producing xI is not monotonic on :
In the following table we show how the expected output changes with :
 ExI ExS
0:31 24.998 50.003
0:34 24.7 50.4
0:4 23.22 52.34
0:5 19.74 57.28
0:6 15.65 64.04
0:7 11.11 73.56
0:8 6.46 85.15
0:9 2.68 94.25
0:99 0.22 99.54
We see that the fear of being predated makes rm I produce less and less when predation becomes
more and more protable (large ) which, in turn, makes room for rm S to produce a larger
output.
Next we compute the probability that both rms survive, p1.
 p1
0:31 0.999
0:34 0.991
0:4 0.95
0:5 0.87
0:6 0.77
0:7 0.61
0:8 0.38
0:9 0.16
0:99 0.01
Again we see that, when  increases, despite the shrinking of rm I this rm is bankrupt with a
larger and larger probability. This reects the larger protability of predation. This is displayed
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in the next table which shows payo¤s in the Markov equilibrium.
 VI(I ; S) VS(S ; I)
0:31 905.68 3623.34
0:34 927.37 3811.28
0:4 914.93 4316.04
0:5 793.95 5540.32
0:6 571.10 7473.90
0:7 281.18 10809.71
0:8 73.39 17564.55
0:9 9.29 37400.32
0:99 0.054 389195.95
(4.11)
Note that for  = 0:31 (which is almost the threshold  = 0:3077) the payo¤s in the MPE are close
to the discounted Cournot payo¤s (CI =(1   ) = 905:79; and CS =(1   ) = 3623:20), and when
 = 0:99; VS(S ; I) ' MS =(1  ):
We now focus on the consequences of bankruptcy on the maximum collusive outcome com-
paring the traditional framework without bankruptcy considerations and our framework. For the
traditional case, we use Cournot reversion as punishment, formally
maxS(xS ; xI) + I(xI ; xS)
s:t: S(xS ; xI)  (1  )(aS   xI
2
)2 + CS
I(xI ; xS)  (1  )(aI   xS
2
)2 + CI
Under bankruptcy considerations we use the MPE prots as punishment and we also have to
consider the incentives to predate. Formally,
maxS(xS ; xI) + I(xI ; xS)
s:t S(xS ; xI)  (1  )(aS   xI
2
)2 + (1  )VS(S ; I)
I(xI ; xS)  (1  )(aI   xS
2
)2 + (1  )VI(I ; S)
S(xS ; xI)  (1  )(aS   aI)(aI   xI) + MS
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As in the previous example, we have computed the maximum collusive outcome for aS = 125 and
aI 2 f100; 105; 110; 115; 120,124g and  '  up to :99. We show here the results for aS = 125; aI =
100:
Example 3. Going back to Example 2, the following table shows the maximum joint prots under
bankruptcy considerations (left part of the table, named B), and without bankruptcy considerations
(right part of the table, named NB).
B
 I + S (xI ; xS)
0:31 3375.33 (20.982,44.04)
0:34 3389.66 (20.31,43.61)
0:4 3437.27 (18.55,46.25)
0:5 3549.79 (14.24,48.92)
0:6 3667.23 (9.56,52.88)
0:7 3775.83 (5.21,57.75)
0:8 3845.58 (2.41,60.66)
0:9 3881.08 (1.00,61.82)
0:99 3903.90 (0.09,62.43)
 I + S (xI ; xS)
0:31 3375.28 (20.984,44.039)
0:34 3389.66 (20.57,43.44)
0:4 3412.59 (19.74,42.24)
0:5 3437.5 (18.59,41.89)
0:6 3457.6 (17.66,42.17)
0:7 3474.68 (16.85,42.44)
0:8 3489.47 (16.13,42.69)
0:9 3502.45 (15.48,42.93)
0:99 3512.88 (14.96,43.13)
NB
We see that when bankruptcy is taken into consideration, joint prots supported by grim trigger
strategies are larger than those in the standard case. It is particularly noteworthy that when  is
very close to 1 and thus, the maximum prot achievable under non bankruptcy is almost on the
prot frontier, the scenario with bankruptcy allows much larger prots to be implemented. This
is because the possibility of bankruptcy a¤ects both rms asymmetrically. On the one hand, the
superior rm has the chance to become a monopolist. On the other hand, the inferior rm has the
risk to be eliminated. Thus, the mixed strategy equilibrium is more favorable to the superior rm
and shifts prots in the direction of the superior rm. In Figure 1 we show the maximum prot
possibility frontier which is the solid line, and the isoprots which is the dotted line. It is easy to
see that, when we are close to the frontier, a decrease in the prots of the inferior rm increases
joint prots as happens in this example.
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Figure 1
The ndings in the previous two examples are robust to the consideration of di¤erent aI . But
in the next example we see that the e¤ect of bankruptcy constraints on social welfare depends on
more subtle considerations.
Example 4. One period social welfare -denoted by W - is dened as the sum of consumer (aX  
X2=2   pX) and producer (pX   cSxS   cIxI) surpluses. Thus W = aSxs + aIxI  X2=2. The
following table shows how the welfare between the maximum collusive outcome with (WB) and
without (WNB) bankruptcy varies with aI and . We have selected only the values for which
this di¤erence is negative. For the other values in our simulations that we do not show here this
di¤erence is positive (the table is available under request)
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aI   WB  WNB XB XN
105 0:338 0:34  0:0043 65:1170 65:1173
105 0:35  0:21 64:75 64:76
110 0:367 0:37  0:032 65:188 65:190
110 0; 4  3:8872 63:938 64:0726
115 0:39 0; 4  0:1987 65:247 65:252
120 0:42 0:43  0:8578 65:29 65:31
120 0:45  7:45 64:36 64:51
124 0:44 0:45  1:165 65:51 65:53
124 0:5  35:69 62:88 63:47
We see that these values always happen when total output is larger for the best collusive outcome
under non bankruptcy. The explanation for this is the following. As we show in the previous
example, the possibility of bankruptcy shifts the maximum joint prot that can be supported as
an equilibrium increasing the output of the superior rm and decreasing the output of the inferior
rm. We have two e¤ects on welfare (as in Lahiri and Ono (1988)). On the one hand, we have the
competition e¤ect in which a larger output increases social welfare. On the other hand, we have the
technological e¤ect in which the output is produced more ine¢ ciently. Thus, when aggregate output
is larger in the best collusive outcome that can be supported with bankruptcy, than the one that
can be supported without bankruptcy, both e¤ects go in the same direction and the e¤ect on social
welfare is unambiguous (larger under bankruptcy than under non bankruptcy). However, when
aggregate output is smaller in the best collusive outcome that can be supported with bankruptcy,
than the one that can be supported without bankruptcy, both e¤ects go in di¤erent directions and,
indeed, the technological e¤ect might overcome the competition e¤ect. Finally, note that this only
happens when discount is very close to the minimum discount for which predation is protable. This
is because, for these discount values, predation is not very protable so the incentive to increase
output beyond the Cournot level is small and so is the technological e¤ect. In contrast, when rms
do not discount future that much, aggregate output reect the predation of the superior rm and
the technological and the competition e¤ects go in the same direction.
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5. Final Remarks
Our results are obtained at the cost of making several simplifying assumptions to make the model
tractable. Here we discuss some of the issues arising from these simplications.
No accumulation
In this paper we focused on outputs that make other rms bankrupt, but we did not consider
the funds that might support or deter aggressive strategies (the "deep pocket" argument). Our
research strategy is to analyze the incentives to prey in the simplest possible case where no funds
can be accumulated. A fully edged model of accumulation and predation is, no doubt, preferable
but it is beyond the scope of our paper. In other cases, accumulation of prots might play an
important role in shaping the MPE set as in the model of Rosenthal and Rubinstein (1984).2
Credit
If credit is given on the basis of past performance, the redenition of the BF set can be applied
here and credit can be incorporated into the model. However, if credit is given on the basis of future
performance, future performance also depends on credit (via the BF constraints), which makes this
problem extremely complex. This points to a deep conceptual problem about credit in oligopolist
markets where rms might be made bankrupt. This topic should be the subject of future research.
Entry
In this paper we assumed that the disappearance of a rm does not bring a new one into the
market. Of course this should not be taken literally. What we mean is that if entry does not
quickly follow, it makes sense, as a rst approximation, to analyze the model with a given number
of rms. For instance it can be shown that when rms do not discount future too much and costs
and demand are linear, ruining a rm is a good investment even if monopoly lasts for one period.
In other cases, though, the nature of equilibria will be altered if, for instance, entry immediately
follows the ruin of a competitor as in the model of Rosenthal and Spady (1989).3
Buying Competitors
2They characterize a subset of the Nash equilibria in the repeated game with no discounting (i.e.,  = 1) where
each player regards the ruin of the other player as the best possible outcome and his own ruin as the worst possible
outcome.
3They consider a prisoners dilemma in continuous time in a market with room for two rms only. When a rm
goes bankrupt, this rm is immediately replaced by a new entrant. They show that some kind of predatory behavior
may arise in equilibrium.
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In our model, there is no option to buy a rm. Sometimes it is argued that buying an opponent
may be a cheaper and safer strategy than ruining it. We do not deny that buying competitors plays
an important role in business practices. However, we do not agree that under the option of buying,
ruining a competitor is irrational. First, buying competitors may be forbidden by a regulatory body
because of anticompetitive e¤ects. Second, when the owner of a rm sells it to competitors, this
does not stop her from creating a new rm and nancing it with the money received from selling the
old one. In other words, selling a rm is not equivalent to a contract in which the owner commits
not to enter into a market again. Thus, bankruptcy may be the only credible way of getting rid
of a competitor. Finally, buying and ruining competitors may complement each other because the
acquisition value may depend on the aggressiveness of the buyer in the past; see Burns (1986) for
some evidence in the American tobacco industry. Thus, it seems that a better understanding of
the mechanism of ruin might help the further enhancement of our understanding of how the buying
mechanism works in this case.
Summing up, the model presented in this paper sheds some light on certain aspects of the
equilibrium in oligopolist markets in which rms may make each other bankrupt. We hope that
the insights obtained here can be used in further research in this area.
6. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 4, the existence of MPE is established for   . So, in the
following proof, we only consider cases in which  > .
There are 4 possible states in our dynamic game. Namely, the set of active rms is (1) S and
I, (2) S (3) I, and (4) empty.4 Since there is a single active rm (monopoly) in states (2) and
(3), that rm simply chooses the monopoly output. In (4), no strategic decision can be made. In
this way, for any MPE, Markovian strategies in states (2), (3) and (4) are uniquely determined,
and continuation prots in those states are derived accordingly. Note also that state transition is
irreversible. If a state changes from (1) to any other one from (2) to (4), it is impossible for rms to
move this back to (1). Moreover, the continuing game in MPE must stay there forever; no further
4Given our assumption that rm S goes bankrupt only if rm I goes bankrupt, state (3) never arises. Such
property, to some extent, simplies the following proof, but is not needed to establish the existence result. To clarify
this point, we do not impose this assumption in what follows.
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transition can occur.
Since equilibrium Markovian strategies in (2), (3) and (4) are derived above, we focus on
Markovian strategies in the remaining state (1) where both rms are active. Let S and I be a
(mixed) strategy in (1) for S and I, respectively. Note that, depending on realized pure actions
of S and I , state transition, i.e., bankruptcy, may occur. Let ps(S ; I); s = 1; 2; 3; 4, be a
probability such that state (s) would realize when rms play S and I . Then, continuation prot
in state (1) for each rm, denoted by Vi; i = S; I, is expressed as follows.
VS(S ; I) = S(S ; I) + 

p1(S ; I)VS(S ; I) + p2(S ; I)
MS
1  

(6.1)
VI(S ; I) = I(S ; I) + 

p1(S ; I)VI(S ; I) + p3(S ; I)
MI
1  

(6.2)
where Mi is a monopoly prot of rm i = S; I. Solving each equation, we obtain the following.
VS(S ; I) =
1
1  p1(S ; I)

S(S ; I) + p2(S ; I)
MS
1  

(6.3)
VI(S ; I) =
1
1  p1(S ; I)

I(S ; I) + p3(S ; I)
MI
1  

(6.4)
Note that Vi; i = S; I is discontinuous in pure actions (xS ; xI), since the probability of state
realization, ps; s = 1; 2; 3; 4, is discontinuous in (xS ; xI). To establish the existence of MPE, it is
necessary and su¢ cient to show that a Markovian strategy prole (S ; I) constitutes an SPNE
among all Markovian strategies.5 In our dynamic game, deviation in states (2) and (3) cannot be
protable for a remaining active rm, and no deviation is possible in (4). Therefore, without loss of
generality, we can focus on deviation in state (1) alone. This implies that an MPE of our dynamic
game is identical to a Nash equilibrium of a static game in which the payo¤ function of each rm
is set equal to Vi(S ; I); i = S; I. We shall denote this (modied) static game by G.
Fortunately, Theorem 5b in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) (D&M hereinafter) can be invoked
to show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G. Roughly speaking, the existence
is guaranteed when utility functions are bounded and continuous except in a set of measure zero
in the (joint) pure strategy space. More precisely, the theorem requires that (a) discontinuities
occur in a set whose dimension is strictly lower than the dimension of the strategy space, (b)
5Necessity is obvious. To understand su¢ ciency, note that, if the opponent uses Markovian strategy, the player
always has a best reply that is Markovian as well. See, for example, pp.501 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for more
detailed discussion.
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strategy sets are intervals, and (c) when we approach a discontinuity if a rm prot falls, another
rises. Our game clearly satises (b). Since prot function, i; i = S; I, is continuous in (xS ; xI),
discontinuity possibly occurs only at a point in which ps; s = 1; 2; 3; 4, is discontinuous, or a state
transition occurs. Our bankruptcy conditions assure that such state transitions occur in a set whose
dimension is strictly lower than the dimension of the strategy space, and hence (a) is also satised.
Therefore, we only need to check (c).
Given the irreversibility of the state transition mentioned above, there are only 4 possible cases
of discontinuities of ps (or Vi): (i) p1 = 1 ! p2 = 1, (ii) p1 = 1 ! p3 = 1, (iii) p2 = 1 ! p4 = 1,
and (iv) p3 = 1 ! p4 = 1. In (iii), rm I is not active either before or after the state transition
from (2) to (4) occurs. That is, VI = 0 in both (2) and (4), and hence condition (c) is trivially
satised. By the symmetric argument, (c) is also satised in (iv). In (i) and (ii), when the prot
of one rm falls (because this rm goes bankrupt), the prot of the other rm must rise (because
the remaining rm becomes a monopolist). So, (c) is satised in cases (i) and (ii) as well.
We have shown that G satises all the conditions of D&M, and hence the existence of a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of G is guaranteed. Since this equilibrium is essentially identical to the
MPE of our dynamic game, the existence of an MPE is also guaranteed.
Characterization of the support of the Markovian mixed strategy equilibrium.
The Proof of Proposition 3 follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. For any mixed strategy of the other rm, the optimal output that maximizes a rms
expected prot in a period (i.e. E[i(xi; xj) j j ]) is always unique.
Proof. From Assumption EC, argmaxxi>0E[i(xi; xj) j j ] is unique (if it exists), and is op-
timal output is either argmaxxi>0E[i(xi; xj) j j ] or 0: Assumption AC implies that the expected
prot of the former is always positive, so it cannot be the case that both become optimal.
Lemma 8. Given  > , for any equilibrium in mixed strategies,
(i) at least one rm goes bankrupt with strictly positive probability,
(ii) both rms use totally mixed strategies.
Proof. (i) Since  > ; at least one rm is using a totally mixed strategy. Suppose without
loss of generality that it is rm j and suppose that no rm goes bankrupt. Pick any two outputs
x; x0 from the support of the mixed strategy of rm j. Then, the rm must be indi¤erent between
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choosing x and x0. However, given that no bankruptcy occurs, the rms optimal output (to the
other rms equilibrium strategy) is always unique by Lemma 7. Thus, we get a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose on the contrary that rm i uses pure strategy xi (and j uses mixed strategy j). Then,
rm j does not go bankrupt in equilibrium, since choosing such an output in the support of j is
clearly suboptimal. Let x < x0 be two di¤erent outputs in the support of j . Lemma 7 implies
that, in order for j to be indi¤erent between x and x0, bankruptcy must occur in either output.
Since i is decreasing in xj , i must go bankrupt under x0 but not under x. Moreover, the support
of j cannot contain a point other than x and x0 (since choosing such an output cannot yield the
same prot as x and x0 do). However, given that j randomizes only over the two points x and x0,
x must be the best reply to xi in the one period game, since bankruptcy does not occur in such
a case. Then, j has incentive to set x0 as small as possible to make i go bankrupt. But since the
set of outputs that make i bankrupt is open, such a minimum output does not exist. In this way,
(xi; j) cannot be a mutual best reply.
Let us denote the inferior and the superior outputs in the support of the equilibrium (mixed)
strategy for rm i by xi and xi, respectively. By Lemma 8 (ii), we have xi < xi for each i.
Lemma 9. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold for every rm i:
i(xi; xj) > 0:
Proof. Suppose i(xi; xj)  0. By choosing xi = xi, rm i always receives non-positive prot,
and strictly negative prot when xj > xj (note i(xi; xj) is decreasing in xj). Since the latter case
occurs with positive probability, i would always become strictly better o¤ by choosing xi = 0.
Lemma 10. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold for at least one rm:
i(xi; xj) > 0:
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that i(xi; xj)  0 and j(xj ; xi)  0. Combining with Lemma
9, the following inequalities must hold.
i(xi; xj) > 0 and j(xj ; xi)  0) ACi(xi) < p(xi + xj)  ACj(xj); (6.5)
j(xj ; xi) > 0 and i(xi; xj)  0) ACj(xj) < p(xj + xi)  ACi(xi): (6.6)
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Since average costs are constant, the above conditions imply
p(xj + xi)  ACi(xi) = ACi(xi) < p(xi + xj); (6.7)
p(xi + xj)  ACj(xj) = ACj(xj) < p(xj + xi); (6.8)
which is an obvious contradiction.
Lemma 11. If i(xi; xj) > 0 holds, then
(i) xi maximizes the expected per period prot given js mixed strategy, E[i(xi; xj) j j ];
(ii) xi must be isolated from other parts of the support of is equilibrium strategy.
Proof. Since j(xj ; xi) > 0 by Lemma 9, js prot j(xj ; xi) is strictly positive for any
xj 2 [0; xj ]. This implies that probability such that j goes bankrupt is 0 when i chooses an output
su¢ ciently close to xi. Therefore, (i) xi must be optimal given that no bankruptcy occurs, and (ii)
no output close to xi can be contained in is equilibrium support.
Lemma 12. In equilibrium, rm I never produces an output strictly higher than the one which
maximizes its per-period prot given rm Ss equilibrium mixed strategy. That is,
xI  argmax
xI
E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]:
Proof. Note rst that I can make S bankrupt only if I itself goes bankrupt. Hence, rm
I can never be better o¤ by bankrupting rm S. Choosing xI > xI weakly increases the risk of
bankruptcy and strictly reduces I in that period. Therefore, it must be suboptimal.
Lemma 13. The following conditions must hold:
(i) I(xI ; xS)  0:
(ii) S(xS ; xI) > 0:
Proof. We rst verify (i). Suppose on the contrary that I(xI ; xS) > 0 holds. Then,
by Lemma 11, I must choose a strictly larger output than argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ], which
contradicts Lemma 12. Given that (i) holds, (ii) must be satised by Lemma 10.
Lemma 14. Let x0S = argmaxxS E[S(xS ; xI) j I ]: The equilibrium support of rm Ss mixed
strategy is such that xS = x0S :
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Proof. By Lemma 13, S(xS ; xI) > 0:Thus, by Lemma 11, xS maximizes Ss expected prot
(per period) given Is mixed strategy and it is an isolated point. Therefore, xS = x0S :
Lemma 15. In equilibrium, rm I goes bankrupt with positive probability.
Proof. By Lemma 8 at least one rm goes bankrupt. If I does not go bankrupt then rm S is
bankrupt, but this is impossible because whenever rm S is bankrupt rm I is also bankrupt.
Lemma 16. For all xI in Ismixed strategy support, I(xI ; xS)  0:
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 13.
Lemma 17. The probability of bankruptcy at the inmum of the support of Is mixed strategy,
xI , is zero. There is no other output in the support with zero probability of bankruptcy.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that the probability that I goes bankrupt at xI is positive.
This probability is the probability that the superior rm produces xS 2 (~xS ; xS ]; for ~xS such that
p(xI + ~xS) = cI : By Lemma 9 we know that I(xI ; xS) > 0, consequently, I(xI ; xS) > 0: Thus,
~xS 2 (xS ; xS ]: If ~xS is in the support of Ss mixed strategy, rm S; by concentrating all the mass
placed at [~xS + "; xS ] in ~xS + "; the probability of bankruptcy will not change for rm I and will
increase the per period prot of rm S. If ~xS is not in the support of Ss mixed strategy, let
x^S > ~xS be the closest point to ~xS in the support of Ss mixed strategy. Again, rm S; by placing
all the mass placed at [x^S ; xS ] in x^S ; will not change the probability of bankruptcy for rm I and
will increase its per period prot. Finally, by Lemma 12, xI  argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]: If
there is another output in the support di¤erent from xI with zero probability of bankruptcy, ~xI ,
should be such that xI < ~xI  xI : But then, since rm is expected prot function (given the other
rms mixed strategy) is strictly concave in xi; it could not be that the prot of rm I is the same
at xI and at ~xI .
Lemma 18. The support of Is mixed strategy contains at least an interval and the inmum of
the interval is xI .
Proof. Let us see rst that xI cannot be an isolated mass point. If it were, xI would be the
minimum of the support of Is mixed strategy. By Lemma 17 the probability of bankruptcy at xI
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is zero. Thus, xI = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ], but this contradicts Lemma 12. Thus, xI is not
an isolated point and, for the same argument as before, xI cannot be in the support of Is mixed
strategy.
Lemma 19. The equilibrium support of rm Ss mixed strategy contains at least one interval.
Proof. By Lemma 18 the support of Is mixed strategy contains at least one interval, and since
xI  argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ], Is per period prot is strictly increasing and also continuous at
any xI in the interval. Thus, the probability of bankruptcy must be increasing with xI (in order
for I to be indi¤erent in the interval). This is possible only when the support of Ss mixed strategy
also contains an interval where the distribution of xS does not make any jump.
Lemma 20. The support of Is mixed strategy contains a unique interval and no isolated points.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that it contains two intervals (x1I ; x
1
I) and (x
2
I ; x
2
I) with x
1
I <
x1I < x
2
I < x
2
I ; and that there are no isolated outputs between the intervals. Let xS(x
1
I) and xS(x
2
I)
be such that I(x1I ; xS(x
1
I)) = I(x
2
I ; xS(x
2
I)) = 0 : Note rst that it is not optimal for rm S to
have in the support of its mixed strategy outputs in (xS(x2I); xS(x
1
I)); because otherwise rm S; by
concentrating all the mass of the interval (xS(x2I); xS(x
1
I)) in xS(x
2
I); will not change the probability
of bankruptcy of rm I and will increase its per period prot. If there are isolated points between
the two intervals, we can replicate the same argument by considering the biggest isolated point
and the greatest interval. Without loss of generality we can consider just the two intervals without
isolated points in the middle. Let xI = x1I + " with " su¢ ciently small. Since there is no mass in
(xS(x
2
I); xS(x
1
I)); the probability of bankruptcy at x
1
I + " is the same as at x
1
I but the per period
payo¤ is bigger. So it cannot be optimal for rm I to produce x1I : Thus, there is only one interval
in the support of Is mixed strategy. The same argument can be applied in order to discard the
isolated points in the support of Is mixed strategy
Lemma 21. At equilibrium the following should hold:
(i) I(xI ; xS) = 0;
(ii) I(xI ; x1S) = 0; where x
1
S is the inmum of the rst interval in the support of Ss mixed strategy.
Proof.
(i) Lemma 17 implies I(xI ; xS)  0: By Lemma 13 I(xI ; xS)  0: Thus, I(xI ; xS) = 0.
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(ii) Suppose that I(xI ; x1S) < 0. By Lemmas 9 and 14, I(xI ; x
0
S) > 0: Then, xS(xI) dened by
I(xI ; xS(xI)) = 0 is such that x0S < xS(xI) < x
1
S : This implies that when " is su¢ ciently small,
the probability of bankruptcy at any xI 2 (xI   "; xI) does not change. But then, I cannot be
indi¤erent between any two outputs in the interval (xI  "; xI): Thus, I(xI ; x1S)  0: Suppose that
I(xI ; x
1
S) > 0; then, at any xS 2 (x1S ; xS(xI)); the probability of bankruptcy for I is the same, but
then, rm S cannot be indi¤erent in the interval (x1S ; x
1
S + "): Thus, I(xI ; x
1
S) = 0:
Lemma 22. At equilibrium, xI = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]:
Proof. Suppose that xI < argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]: By Lemmas 9 and 14, I(xI ; x0S) > 0
and by Lemma 21, I(xI ; x1S) = 0: At an output xI = xI + " with " su¢ ciently small such that
xI+" < argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j S ]; the probability of bankruptcy is the same as at xI ; but the per
period payo¤ is greater. So xI cannot be the best reply to S : Thus, xI = argmaxxI E[I(xI ; xS) j
S ]:
Lemma 23. The support of Ss mixed strategy contains a unique interval and one isolated point.
Proof. By Lemma 14 xS = x0S and is isolated. By Lemma 21, more than one interval in the
support of Ss mixed strategy would imply that some outputs in the support of Is mixed strategy
produce the same probability of bankruptcy for rm I: But, if this is the case, rm I cannot be
indi¤erent among those outputs. The same kind of argument can be applied to discard any isolated
point bigger than the supremum of the interval. Finally, given that I(xI ; x1S) = 0; if there are two
isolated points smaller than the inmum of the interval then none of those outputs can bankrupt
rm I; but then rm S cannot be indi¤erent among them.
Lemma 24. The inmum of the interval in the support of rm Ss mixed strategy is not in the
support.
Proof. Let xS the inmum of the interval in the support. Since by Lemma 21 I(xI ; x

S) = 0;
by producing xS the probability of bankruptcy for rm I is zero. But this probability is also zero
by producing x0S (the isolated point in Ss support which is the minimum output in the support).
But then, rm S cannot be indi¤erent between x0S and x

S :
Lemma 25. There is a mass point at the supremum of the support of Is mixed strategy, xI :
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Proof. Suppose not. Given that I(xI ; xS) = 0; the probability of bankruptcy for rm I when
xS ! xS is zero. But this is not possible because at x0S the probability of bankruptcy for rm I
is also zero and S is better o¤ at x0S : Therefore, there is a mass point in xI ; pI : In this case, the
probability of bankruptcy for rm I when xS ! xS is pI but at x0S is zero
Those Lemmas complete the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
We start by showing that if the demand is linear, (v) and (vi) in Proposition 3 implies that
xI
 = aI   xS and xI = aI   xS. If xI is greater than zero, the implication is direct. Suppose
that xI = 0 and aI 6= xS: Suppose that xS > aI : At any xS in a neighborhood of xS; the
probability of bankruptcy for rm I is 1; but then rm S cannot be indi¤erent among all the xS in
that neighborhood. Suppose that xS < aI ; and let ~xI 2 (0; xI) be such that ~xI = aI   xS; since
I(xI
; xS) = 0; ~xI exists and is greater than zero. At any xI 2 (0; ~xI) the probability that rm I
is bankrupt is zero, but then rm I cannot be indi¤erent among all xI 2 (0; ~xI):
Let (I ; S) a mixed strategy prole. The payo¤s for each rm given (I ; S) are:
VI(I ; S) =
1
1  p1I(I ; S);
VS(I ; S) =
1
1  p1

S(I ; S) + p2
MS
1  

where p1 is the probability that both rms survive given that strategy and p2 is the probability
that only S survives.
Let us rst prove (i). For rm I; every xI in the support of I has to be the best reply to S : Thus
for each xI in the support,
@VI(xI ; S)
@xI
= 0;
or equivalently
 @p1(xI ;S)@xI
(1  p1)2 I(xI ; S) +
1
1  p1
@I(xI ; S)
@xI
= 0 (6.9)
Given (xI ; S); let us compute rst the probability that both rms survive, p1(xI ; S): By the
characterization of the support in Proposition 3, I(xI ; xS
) = 0 and I(xI; xS) = 0: This implies
that for each xI in the support of I; the inmum output that bankrupt rm I, (aI   xI); is in the
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support of rm S mixed strategy. Thus,
p1(xI ; S) = P (xS  aI   xI) = pS + (1  pS)
Z aI xI
xS
F 0S(xS)dxS ; and
@p1(xI ; S)
@xI
=  (1  pS)F 0S(aI   xI):
Furthermore,
@I(xI ; S)
@xI
= (aI   2xI   ExS)
where ExS is the expected value of the outputs in S support. Let F (xS) = (1  pS)FS(xS): Thus,
expression (6.9) can be written as
 F 0(aI   xI)
(1  p1)2 I(xI ; S) +
1
1  p1
@I(xI ; S)
@xI
= 0;
or equivalently
 F 0(aI   xI)
1  p1 (aI   xI   ExS)xI + (aI   2xI   ExS) = 0 (6.10)
Given that for each xI ; aI   xI 2 (xS ; xS); and for each xS 2 (xS ; xS); there is xI 2 (xI ; xI)
such that aI   xI = xS ; (6.10) can be expressed in terms of xS 2 (xS ; xS);
 F 0(xS)
1  pS   F (xS)(xS   ExS)(aI   xS) + (2xS   aI   ExS) = 0 (6.11)
Let H(xS) = 1  pS   F (xS); and f(xS) = (xS  ExS)(aI   xS): Note that H 0(xS) =  F 0(xS);
and f 0(xS) = aI   xS   xS +ExS =  (2xS   aI  ExS): Using this transformation, (6.11) can be
written as:
H 0(xS)
H(xS)
f(xS)  f 0(xS) = 0
Thus, for H(xS) = Kf(xS) the above equation holds, which implies that
1  pS   F (xS) = K(xS   ExS)(aI   xS); and (6.12)
F 0(xS) = K(2xS   aI   ExS) (6.13)
By (iii) in Proposition 3, xI = argmaxxI I(xI ; S): Therefore, xI
 has to be the solution of the
rst order condition
aI   2xI   ExS = 0:
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By point (vi) in Proposition 3, I(xI; xS) = 0; which implies that xI
 = aI   xS : Thus,
ExS = 2x

S   aI (6.14)
Which implies that
F 0(xS) = 2K(xS   xS) (6.15)
Furthermore,
1  pS =
Z xS
xS
F 0(xS)dxS :
Using (6.15) and integrating,
1  pS = K

(xS
   xS)2 (6.16)
By (6.15), (6.16) and given that (1  pS)F 0S(xS) = F 0(xS);
F 0S(xS) =
2(xS   xS)
(xS   xS)2
; (6.17)
which proves the rst part of (i). For the second part, substituting pS and ExS in (6.12) using
(6.14) and (6.16) we get
1   +K(xS   xS)2   F (xS) = K(xS   2xS + aI)(aI   xS)
F (xS) =
1

  1 + K

(xS
   xS)2  
K

(xS   2xS + aI)(aI   xS)
Given that F (xS) = K (xS
   xS)2;
1

  1  K

(xS
   2xS + aI)(aI   xS) = 0:
Which implies that K should be
K =
1  
(xS   2xS + aI)(aI   xS)
Note that K is positive because aI   xS = xI ; and aI   xS = xI: By (6.16)
pS = 1  F (xS) = 1 
(1  )(xS   xS)2
(xS   2xS + aI)(aI   xS)
(6.18)
31
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806055 
Secondly, we prove (ii). For rm S; every xS in the support of S has to be a best reply to I : In
particular, for each xS 2 (xS ; xS)
@VS(xS ; I)
@xS
= 0;
or equivalently,
 @p1(xS ;I)@xS
(1  p1)

S(xS ; I) + p2
MS
1  

+

@S(xS ; I)
@xS
+ 
MS
1  
@p2(xS ; I)
@xS

= 0 (6.19)
By the (v) and (vi) in Proposition 3, I(xI ; xS
) = 0 and I(xI; xS) = 0: This implies that for
each xS 2 (xS ; xS) in the support of S; the inmum output for rm I that bankrupt rm I is
xI = aI   xS , and aI   xS 2 (xI ; xI): Thus, for xS 2 (xS ; xS) the probability that both rms
survive, p1(xS ; I) is
p1(xS ; I) = P (xI  aI   xS) = (1  pI)
Z aI xS
xI
G0I(xI)dxI ; and (6.20)
@p1(xS ; I)
@xS
=  (1  pI)G0I(aI   xS): (6.21)
Given xS 2 (xS ; xS) the probability that only rm S survives (or equivalently, the probability that
rm S bankrupts rm I) is
p2(xS ; I) = P (xI > aI   xS) = pI + (1  pI)
Z xI
aI xS
G0I(xI)dxI and (6.22)
@p2(xS ; I)
@xS
= (1  pI)G0I(aI   xS) (6.23)
Let G(xI) = (1  pI)GI(xI): Plugging (6.20), (6.21), (6.22) and (6.23) into (6.19) we get
 G0(aI   xS)
1  G(aI   xS)

S(xS ; I) + p2
MS
1  

+

@S(xS ; I)
@xS
+ 
MS
1  G
0(aI   xS)

= 0; (6.24)
For each xS 2 (xS ; xS),
S(xS ; I) = (aS   xS   ExI)xS = (aS   aI + xI   ExI)(aI   xI)
@S(xS ; I)
@xS
= (aS   2xS   ExI) = (aS   2(aI   xI)  ExI);
where ExI is the expected value of the outputs in I support.
Given (6.22) and the transformation G(xS) = (1   pI)GI(xS); p2(xS ; I) = 1   G(aI   xS): By
considering the terms in (6.24) that multiply MS and using that p2(xS ; I) = 1 G(aI   xS);

MS
1  G
0(aI   xS)

1 +
  + G(aI   xS)
1  G(aI   xS)

=
MS G
0(aI   xS)
1  G(aI   xS) :
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Thus, equation (6.24) can be can be expressed in terms of xI 2 (xI ; xI) as
 G0(xI)
1  G(xI)

(aS   aI + xI   ExI)(aI   xI)  MS

+ (aS   2(aI   xI)  ExI) = 0: (6.25)
Let J(xI) = 1 G(xI) and g(xI) = (aS aI+xI ExI)(aI xI) MS : Note that J 0(xI) =  G0(xI)
and g0(xI) =  (aS   2(aI   xI)  ExI): Using this transformation, (6.25) can be written as:
J 0(xI)
J(xI )
g(xI)  g0(xI) = 0
Thus, for J(xI) = Bg(xI) the above equation will hold, which implies that
1  G(xI) = B

(aS   aI + xI   ExI)(aI   xI)  MS

 G0(xI) = B(2(aI   xI)  aS + ExI)
By (iv) in Proposition 3, x0S = argmaxxS S(xS ; I): Therefore, x
0
S has to be the solution of the
rst order condition aS   2x0S   ExI = 0: Thus,
ExI = aS   2x0S (6.26)
Which implies that
G(xI) =
1

  B


(2x0S   aI + xI)(aI   xI)  MS

; and (6.27)
G0(xI) = B2(x0S   (aI   xI)) (6.28)
Using (6.28) and integrating,
1  pI =
Z xI
xI
G0(xI)dxI =
B

h
(aI   xI)2   (aI   xI)2 + 2x0S(xI   xI)
i
= (6.29)
=
B

(xI
   xI)

xI
 + xI   2aI + 2x0S

(6.30)
Since G0I(xI) = G
0(xI)=(1  pI); then
G0I(xI) =
2(x0S   (aI   xI))
(xI   xI)

xI + xI   2aI + 2x0S
 (6.31)
which proves the rst part of (ii). For the second part, since G(xI) = 0; and by (6.27) G(x

I) =
1
   B
h
(2x0S   aI + xI)(aI   xI)  MS
i
;
B =
1
(2x0S   aI + xI)(aI   xI)  MS
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which implies that
pI = 1 
(xI
   xI)

xI
 + xI   2aI + 2x0S


h
(2x0S   aI + xI)(aI   xI)  MS
i : (6.32)
Finally, to prove (iii), (4.6) follows from (6.14) (that is, ExS = 2xS   aI); equation (4.7) follows
from (6.26) (that is, ExI = aS   2x0S); equation (4.8) is obtained because if x0S and xS are in
the support of S ; VS(x0S ; I) = VS(xS
; I): Since by (vii) in Proposition 3 I(xI; x0S) > 0; the
probability that both rms survive, p1(x0S ; I) = 1; and the probability that only rm S survives,
p2(x
0
S ; I) = 0: By (v) in Proposition 3, I(x

I ; xS
) = 0: Thus, at (xS; I), p1(xS; I) = 0; and
the probability that only rm S survives, p2(xS; I) = 1: Therefore,
VS(x
0
S ; I) =
1
1  S(x
0
S ; I);
VS(xS
; I) = S(xS; I) + 
MS
1   :
Since any output in the support of S has to give the same payo¤,
1
1  S(x
0
S ; I) = S(xS
; I) + 
MS
1  
1
1   (aS   x
0
S   ExI)x0S = (aS   xS   ExI)xS + 
MS
1  
By (6.28), ExI = aS   2x0S : Thus
1
1   (x
0
S)
2 = (2x0S   xS)xS + 
MS
1   :
Finally, (4.9) and (4.10) follow from (v) and (vi) in Proposition 3 and our remark at the beginning
of this proof.
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